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by joseph P. Bindbeutel'
A variety of bills are currently being
debated by the Missouri Legislature pro-
viding for a so called environmental
audit privilege. In their purest forms,
these bills empower polluters to conceal
violations of law from the public and en-
vironmental agencies and also immunize
illegal conduct from both civil and crimi-
nal process. The promise of these pro-
posals is that companies who are
otherwise fearful of regulatory reprisal for
violations of law found in audits, will, if
granted both an evidentiary privilege for
audit reports and immunity for acts dis-
covered in the audit process, conduct
audits and subsequently correct any defi-
ciencies discovered. Bills containing
both the privilege and immunity provi-
sions, however only serve to hamper en-
vironmental enforcement efforts in
Missouri. Such bills represent a radical
departure from traditional notions of the
law of privileges and are unnecessary in
light of current enforcement policies in
Missouri which adequately recognize
and reward self-evaluation, self-reporting
and prompt remediation.
Of course, environmental audits are a
useful tool for companies, both large
and small, to review their compliance
status and address any outstanding vio-
lations. A central theme under our sys-
tem of jwstice is that all persons are
obligate'd to find out what legal stan-
dards apply to their activities and con-
form their behavior to such standards.
Environmental audits are nothing more
than a formalized, technical effort to dis-
charge this fundamental responsibility.
However, an audit privilege allowing the
information contained in such an evalua-
tion to be withheld from the public and
governmental agencies is unnecessary.
There has never been an environmental
enforcement case cited in the State of
Missouri where an environmental audit
has been used to advance a civil or
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, pro-
tections from the perceived evil of over-
reaching regulators, are simply not
needed. By allowing environmental vio-
lators to secret environmental problems
from the public, receive immunity for en-
vironmental misdeeds, and then delaying
environmental enforcement with pro-
tracted pretrial litigation, these proposals
reverse the conventional motivations to
remedy problems as promptly as possi-
ble. Our environmental laws currently
send a powerful message that those who
are in a position to prevent or remedy
environmental violations must do so. The
notion that a company can escape
prosecution, even from criminal conduct,
solely by auditing and belatedly taking
some action to correct its wrongdoing is
unparalleled in any other enforcement
scheme of which the author is aware.
Should not other criminals enjoy similar
protection if they simply confess and
agree to mend their ways?
PRMILEGES AND IMMUNmES ARE
UNNECESSARY IN FACT AND
UNFAVORED IN LAW
The Office of the Attorney General
serves as legal counsel, in environmental
enforcement litigation, both civil and
criminal, brought by the State of Mis-
souri. This office works hand-in-hand
with the Department of Natural Re-
sources, and its boards and commis-
sions to implement a fair and
even-handed approach, to environmental
prosecutions across the state. We also
cooperate fully with federal authorities,
including the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Department of justice, to
bring federal criminal prosecution in se-
lected cases of substantial environmental
violations. In the last three years the At-
torney General's office has resolved well
over four hundred enforcement matters
and collected over $5 million in penal-
ties, fines, forfeitures, response costs and
natural resource damages from environ-
mental violators in the state. Our active
enforcement caseload is approximately
four hundred fifty cases. During this
time, the Office of the Attorney General
has never used an environmental audit
or the information contained in an audit
(continued on Page 136)
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Some state legislatures have
responded by enacting laws that create
an environmental audit privilege and, in
some cases, providing limited immunity
for companies who report their
non-compliance. In July of 1993, the
State of Oregon enacted the first
environmental audit privilege low.5 Not
surprisingly, the Colorado legislature
followed Oregon's lead in 1994,
enacting a statute that provided an
environmental privilege and limited
immunity for companies that self-report
their non-compliance.6 That same year,
privilege statutes were passed in
Kentucky" as well Indiana.8 Last year,
privilege statutes were enacted in ten
other states: Arkansas,9  Idaho,10
Illinois,"I Kansas, 12  Minnesota, 13
Mississippi24 Texas,15 Utah, 16 Virginia,1"
and Wyoming." This year Michigan,' 9
New Hampshire20 and South Dakota2'
have all passed privilege statutes.
The enactment of seventeen laws
over a period of three years is
remarkable progress for a new
environmental issue, especially since ten
of those laws were adopted in 1995
alone. In the midwest, in particular, state
legislators have embraced the concept of
environmental audit privileges. Missouri
is nearly surrounded by states with new
privilege laws - Illinois, Kansas,
Arkansas, and Kentucky. Fortunately, the
Missouri legislature has taken action as
well. Two bills have been introduced in
the Missouri House and Senate to
establish an environmental self-evaluation
privilege.22 In addition, these bills and
two others23 provide limited immunity for
companies that voluntarily disclose
non-compliance discovered through an
environmental self-evaluation. On
January 23, 1996, the House Energy
and Environmental Committee passed a
privilege and immunity bill, House Bill
(H.B.) 945, to the full House with a
"do-pass" recommendation. On March
25, H.B. 945 passed the full House. If
the Missouri legislature passes H.B. 945,
the regulated community will be
encouraged to conduct environmental
self-evaluations. This will serve to
enhance environmental compliance in
Missouri.
The traditional means of
compliance monitoring in Missouri, and
elsewhere, has been to impose
standards by legislative fiat. Police
compliance then follows through
inspections by EPA and DNR
representatives. However, as the
volumes of statutes, regulations, rules and
court decisions have grown over the
decades, state agency budgets have not
kept pace. In Missouri, DNR currently
employs approximately - 170
inspectors/investigators; they cannot
possibly "police" the tens of thousands of
regulated facilities across the state. The
regulated community, with more intimate
knowledge of their own facilities, has
both the resources and the expertise to
police themselves. For those companies
that may lack in-house compliance
auditors, there are many sophisticated
environmental consulting firms in Missouri
with auditing expertise. In fact, some of
those consulting firms utilize former DNR
inspectors and enforcement chiefs. But
whether a compliance audit is conducted
by in-house personnel or outside
consultants, it is axiomatic that the
audited company, not a government
agency, is in the best position to correct
non-compliance. Companies will be
better positioned to correct any such
non-compliance if they are encouraged
to self-evaluate their facilities.
Critics of audit privilege laws
are quick to claim that the regulated
community may abuse such laws by
hiding non-compliance in an audit
report. If that were the case, the
OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963 (1993).
6 CoLo. Rrv. SlAT. § 13-25-126.5 (1994).
7 KY. REv. STA. Am. § 224.01-040 (Baldwin 1994).
' IND.CODE § 13-10-3-1 (1994).
9 ARK.CoDE § 8-1-301 to-312 (1995).
in IDAHOCODE § 91802 (1995).
" lit. ANN. STAT. ch. 415, § 5/52.2 (Smilh-Hurd 1995).
12 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3332 to -3339 (1996).
' Minnesota's Environmental Improvement Act is a 4year pilot projeci that allows the waiver of penaliies against companies that utilize a selievaluation checklist to
audit their facilities, report problems, and commit to prompt correction of violations. This pilot project does not have an audit privilege component. H.R. 1479, 79th
leg., Reg. Sess. (1995) (enacted).
14 Miss. CODE ANN. §49-2-71 (1995).
t5 Tr. REv. Cu. STAi. ANN. art. 4447 cc. [West 1996).
16 UTA CoDE ANN. § 197-104 (1996).
7 VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-199 (Michie 1995).
18 Wyo. Siw. § 35-11-1105 to -1 106 (1995).
19 Mca.Sm.ANN. § 324.101 (Callaghan 1996).
* N.H. Rv. STAi. Am. § 4-147E) (1996).
21 S.D.CoDoIEDAW5ANN. §§ 1-40-33 to-37 (19961.
2 S.B. 529, 88tb leg., 2d Sess. (1996) and H.B. 945, 88th leg., 2d Sess. (1996).
" S.B. 561, 88th Leg., 2d Sess. (1996) and H.B. 1053, 88th leg., 2d Sess. (1996). These are not privilege bills; they would establish limited immunity, however,
for companies that voluntarily report non-compliance discovered through an environmental audit. Under these bills, DNR is authorized (but not mandated) to keep
environmental audit reports confidential, and closed to the public. If the public obtained the reports, from DNR or elsewhere, however, no privilege would allach.
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legislatures in fourteen states have been
duped into passing cover-up laws.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
The audit privilege laws enacted across
the country do not allow companies to
hide their non-compliance. Missouri S.B.
529 and H.B. 945 contain similar
safeguards. First, in order to be
privileged, the audit must be conducted
to "determine compliance." If
non-compliance is discovered, it must be
remedied. Otherwise, no privilege will
be available. Furthermore, if evidence
establishes that the audit was conducted
for a "fraudulent purpose," no privilege
would attach. For example, if a
company knew, or had reason to know
that it was out of compliance, then
conducted the audit as a means of
"shielding" the results, that audit would
not be privileged.
In addition, the privilege would
not attach if the non-compliance has to
be reported under existing environmental
lows. There are many lows that require
reports to DNR and EPA in areas such as
occidental spills, hazardous waste
disposal, and permit violations. Under
S.B. 529 and H.B. 945, the privilege
would have no effect on existing
reporting obligations. Furthermore, DNR
would retain full authority to inspect
facilities, identify non-compliance and
issue penalties. Audits will not shield or
hide non-compliance from the
government.
The most effective part of an
environmental privilege statute, in my
opinion, is a requirement that the
company have on "implementation plan"
that addresses the correction of past
non-compliance, improvement of current
compliance, or prevention of future
non-compliance. For the statute to be
fair, environmental audits should be
encouraged and should lead to
improved compliance. Only then will a
privilege law benefit the environment.
Environmental enforcement
officials in Missouri argue that they
typically do not seek audit reports,
therefore, an audit privilege is
unnecessary. Surprisingly, however,
Missouri enforcement officials ore not
willing to forego the ability to obtain
audit reports. They simply oppose audit
privileges. Apparently, therefore, when
enforcement actions warrant, those
officials want to be able to use audit
reports against the companies that
prepared them. An inherent conflict exits
when enforcement officials say they do
not request audits, yet fight to retain the
right to do so.24
That conflict has a simple
solution. Government officials should,
indeed, have full access to environmental
audits reports and should be able to use
those reports against the subject
companies when it really counts - when
the companies fail to correct the
non-compliance uncovered in their own
audits. But, if a company takes
appropriate corrective action, -the
government should not use the most
critical compliance tool, the audit report,
as a hammer for penalties. Under
Missouri H.B. 945 and S.B. 529,
enforcement agencies will be able to use
audit reports against companies that fail
to correct violations discovered in their
self-evoluotions; but not against the
companies that "do the right thing."
I close this article by examining,
the "worst nightmare" offered by crilics of
the Missouri privilege legislation: "What
if Russell Bliss25 could have taken
advantage of an audit privilege low?"
My answer to that question is simple and
straightforward: I wish he had taken
advantage of a privilege low. In order
to do so, Mr. Bliss would have 1)
conducted compliance audits of his tank
form facilities and the various sites in
Eastern Missouri at which he sprayed
dioxin; 2) discovered extensive
contamination at all of those sites; and 3)
cleaned up those sites.
Obviously, Mr. Bliss could not
have afforded such an undertaking. But
those opposed to an audit privilege are
quick to argue that Bliss might have
covered his tracks if he had conducted
the audits and "cloaked" the audit
reports in a privilege. Nothing could be
further from the truth. Without performing
a clean up, none of his assessment
reports would be privileged. More
importantly, enforcement officials would
retain their full range of investigation
authority. Everything that EPA and DNR
did in the 1970's and 1980's, the soil
sampling, the interviews of truck drivers,
obtaining Bliss' corporate records
through subpoena, interrogating Bliss,
etc., would remain available in spite of a
privilege law. In the final analysis, only
two things could happen if Russell Bliss
had been able to utilize a self-evaluation
prMlege 1) the government would
conduct the same investigation
conducted in the '70's and '80's,
because privilege statutes do not affect
the government's power to investigate
and prosecute; or 2) Mr. Bliss would
have taken advantage of the privilege
statute by identifying all his contaminated
sites and cleaning them up. Think how
the loner result would have changed
environmental enforcement in Missouri.
24 According to the 1995 Price Waterhouse survey, EPA and state agencies have not refrained from requesling audit reports. Three industry groups reported that 25%
of their ranks had been asked for audit reports (Business Services and Supplies industry; Food, Beverage & Tobacco industries; and Forest or Paper Products). The
industry group reporting the lowest frequency of government requests for audit reports was the industrial or Form Equipment Industry. Even there, one in ten companies
reported that government agencies had requested copies of their audit reports. PacE WATERHOusE SuRVEY, supro note 3, at 33.
25 Mr. Russell Bliss was responsible for spraying dioxin ot a number of sites in Eastern Missouri in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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to discover and then prosecute a viola-
tion. We have never employed formal
discovery to obtain an environmental
audit, nor have we never sought a puni-
tive civil penalty or jail time for violators
of environmental standards who have
discovered their own misdeeds, promptly
reported them to proper authorities and
swiftly remedied all resulting environ-
mental harm. We give substantial
credit, in our prosecutorial discretion, for
those environmental violators who dis-
close their excedences and promptly
commit to a timely and adequate reme-
diation of any environmental damage
occasioned by such violations. Admit-
tedly, most environmental regulatory
schemes do carry, inter alia, significant
statutory penalties.2 However, most envi-
ronmental non-compliance is resolved
prior to any enforcement activity by a
state or federal agency. Remaining non-
compliance is most often resolved prior
to trial by settlements which are most ap-
propriately reached after the participants
have openly exchanged information
about the alleged violation and the best
means to remedy the some. Should trial
be necessary, all information relevant to
how and why a violation occurred and
how it is best remedied, should be be-
fore the trier of fact. A privilege and im-
munity will turn our system around by
rewarding violators who withhold infor-
mation and prevent regulators from mak-
ing the wisest enforcement decisions.
The flexibility that environmental enforce-
ment agencies currently possess in this
complex area of law enforcement is nec-
essary to achieve an appropriate result
in each case.
Federal agencies have made similar,
although more formal policy pronounce-
ments in this area. The Environmental
Protection Agency has recently published
its environmental audit policy3 and the
Department of Justice has adopted a par-
allel policy encouraging voluntary com-
pliance indicating they will not seek
environmental audits from regulated enti-
lies prior to receipt of other information
suggesting the entity has committed vio-
lations of environmental law. Self-
reporting, cooperation and acceptance
of responsibility are effective programs
which those federal agencies wish to
advance. These acts are mitigating fac-
tors in the sentencing phase of environ-
mental criminal cases. The United
States, in appropriate cases, waives all
civil penalties against those who
promptly act to remedy violations discov-
ered in so-called "compliance assistance
programs" and also reduces civil penal-
ties in cases where entities self-report
violations.
Aside from the practical problems,
the measures would pose in enforce-
ment, evidentiary privileges are quite lim-
ited in our legal system. They interfere
with the truth-seeking process by limiting
access to relevant and often very persuo-
sive evidence. As the Supreme Court




'the public. . . has a right to
every man's evidence' and,
therefore, they must be strictly
construed and accepted only to
the very limited extent that per-
mitting refusal to testify or ex-
cluding relevant evidence as a
public good transcending the
normally predominant principle
of utilizing all rational means for
ascertoining the truth .
At common low, privileges were es-
tablished to protect socially favored rela-
tionships (clergyconfessor,
doctor-patient, husband-wife, attorney-
client) which required confidentiality to
assure complete, frank exchanges of
2 For instance, ihe Missouri Clean Water Law carries a statutory maximum penally of $10,000 per violation,
Incentives for Sell Policing: Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706.
445 U.S. 40, 5011980) (emphasis added).
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information. No such hallowed relation-
ship exists between corporation and en-
vironmental consultant.
Also, current proposals not only es-
tablish a privilege, but extend it beyond
historical, constitutional bounds. Unlike
individuals, corporations enjoy no gen-
eral privilege under the 5th Amendment
against self-incrimination. Traditionally,
corporations could not withhold incrimi-
nating documents that are responsive to
government subpoenas or discovery re-
quests. This would change with the pro-
posed privilege low.
Fundamentally, the environmental
audit privilege would restrict the law en-
forcement community's ability to cleanly
and efficiently gather information neces-
sary for a successful environmental en-
forcement effort. The privilege interferes
with the ability of enforcers to obtain
relevant evidence and their ability to de-
termine the truth. These bills contained
lengthy, complex procedural mecha-
nisms whereby in camera examinations
are to be held to review the audit prior
to disclosure to law enforcement authori-
ties. The bills would set up *mini trials'
over whether a particular audit would be
deserving of the privilege, whether it had
been waived or whether it was done for
a fraudulent purpose. Prosecutors will
be at a profound disadvantage in those
hearings because they will have none of
the information of the time of the in cam-
ero examination upon which to make
such determinations which would be left
solely to the reviewing court.
The environmental field is not the only
legal arena involving complex legislative
and regulatory systems. For instance,
tax, securities, governmental contracts
involved equally or frequently for more
complex regulations and self-reporting as
well, but there is no commensurate evi-
dentiary privilege for audits or internal
reviews performed in connection with
these subjects.
per day. Mo. REv. Si. § 644.076.1 (1994).
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Advocates of the audit privilege con-
tend that strong environmental enforce-
ment has discouraged environmental
auditing by regulated companies. The
most recent survey of trends in environ-
mental auditing, Price Waterhouses' Vol-
untory Environmental Audit Survey of
U.S. Business (March 1995), however,
finds that 75% of companies surveyed
have existing auditing programs, and
one-third of those companies without ex-
isting auditing programs soon plan to
begin such auditing.5 One of the main
reasons for the increase in auditing is the
strength of federal, state and local envi-
ronmental enforcement programs. Com-
panies aware of their own environmental
violations tend to address those viola-
tions if they know that they will be sub-
jec to potentially severe criminal
sanctions, civil penalties and the prohibi-
tive costs of remediating the environ-
mental harm.
Also, in exchange for granting blan-
ket immunity, how is the public interest
advanced? A number of the bills are
somewhat vague in describing when a
company would obtain the immunity and
whether past, unremediated environ-
mental harm resulting from the underlying
violation must be addressed to merit
forgiveness. In this regard, Senate Bill
529 extends the privilege in the event
the violator "initiates an . . . appropriate
effort to achieve compliance, pursues
compliance with due diligence and cor-
rects the non-compliance within two
years after the completion of the environ-
mental audit." 6  Such ambiguous
standards give critics little comfort and
assurance that the immunity will result in
either better environmental behavior or a
cleaner environment. An absolute and
unambiguous commitment to achieve
and maintain compliance, as well as
remedy any past environmental harm
should be a threshold requirement for
any level of amnesty.
ROLE OF THE PUBUC
Importantly, our state and federal en-
vironmental statutes are grounded in the
assumption that the people have a right
to know about and to protect themselves
and their families from environmental
hazards.7 Also, environmental statutes
give citizens an opportunity to provide
input with respect to a variety of regula-
tory determinations, such as permitting,
environmental impact statements and
draft regulations. Citizens also have a
right to challenge those actions in court,
to protect their interests in a safe and
healthy environment. Citizens' suits are
another tool citizens have to stop on-
going violations when the government
has failed to do so. Statutory authoriza-
tion for companies to conceal violations
runs counter to the traditional effort to
have citizens involved in improving
environmental performance. Without
ready access to public information re-
garding the compliance status of facili-
ties, the public's role as enforcement
watchdog in the process would be
greatly reduced.
ALTERNATIVES
There are some environmental audit
initiatives which have been met with
great support in the law enforcement
community. A process which would al-
low companies to self-evaluate, report
findings to the appropriate environ-
mental agency, receive substantial relief
from punitive civil enforcement actions
and contain a strong presumption of no
criminal action for underlying violations
found (in the event all violations are ad-
dressed and environmental harm remedi-
ated) is a promising approach.
However, the privilege (secrecy) portion
of most existing bills and the blanket im-
munity provisions are simply not wise
policy and will not achieve the promised
results.
See also, note, Environmental Criminal'Enforcement and Corporate Environmental Auditing: Time for Compromise?. 31 Am. Cm. L. RE. 123 (1993).
6 S. 529, 88th leg., 1996 Mo. Legis. Serv. § 490.762.1.(3).
7 See Emergency Planning and Community RighHo-Know Act, CERCIA Tite 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1 101V05.
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